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Analysis of Zircuit Sorting Mechanism
Zircuit has enabled the SLS mechanism, which is designed to isolate 'malicious transactions'.
Authored by: 0xTodd
Taking advantage of the official TGE of Zircuit's $ZRC, let's talk about an interesting mechanism in this project regarding the sequencer.
Zircuit has its own L2, which is characterized by the creation of a solution called "Sequencer Level Security (SLS)".
We all know that the import and export of transactions on L2 are currently done through the official sorter of the project party. Of course, due to the existence of ZK/ challenge proofs, we are not particularly worried about the sorter's misconduct.
Overall, the sorter is a neutral role, always impartially executing every transaction.
So, even though the sorter is neutral, can we make an effort to join the camp of kindness?
So, Zircuit has enabled this SLS mechanism, which is designed to isolate 'malicious transactions'.
Normally, how does an L2 transaction get onto the chain? It's a simple four-step process:
User initiates transaction and broadcasts
Transactions to the memory pool (mempool) waiting
As a neutral party, the sorter helps to package it into the Block.
Transaction on the chain
However, based on the SLS mechanism, this step has become five steps:
User initiates transaction and broadcasts
Transactions to the memory pool (mempool) waiting
As a benevolent faction, the sorter uses some tools to check whether transactions are malicious.
If there is no malicious intent, help it package into the Block
Trading on the blockchain
But if there is a suspected malicious transaction? The process changes starting from step four:
If suspected of malicious intent, enter the isolation pool
After verifying the correctness of the isolation pool, the sorter continues to pack it.
Or:
If suspected of malicious intent, enter the isolation pool
If the isolation pool review finds that it is indeed a malicious transaction, then refuse to package it onto the chain
The standard for checking whether SLS is malicious may use some open source libraries and AI assistance to determine.
There is hope for achieving some effects in the future, such as stolen assets that may never be transferred or cross back to L1. It is meaningful for the current hostile on-chain environment, known as the dark forest.
Of course, since it is a transaction inspection, it is inevitable that there may be some false positives. However, I understand that by improving the Algorithm of the isolation pool, it can effectively drop such issues as much as possible.
This is a double-edged sword. Blockchain emphasizes permissionless, which is slightly contradictory to SLS. From the perspective of normal users, this kind of L2 is indeed safer.
But overall, I feel that although it has a slight impact on permissionless, the increase in security, especially in protecting inexperienced users, is still worthwhile.
Attached at the end: Zircuit's SLS mechanism paper in its original form: